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Fear is a primal instinct; it is a survival mechanism the evolution of which allowed the 
early humans, indeed all species to adapt, evolve, and survive.  When humans moved into 
settled communities with more advanced means of production, the nature of fear – much like 
the nature of social relationships – changed.  Once the means of social reproduction were 
secured, fear became less necessary as a survival instinct and more useful as a heuristic 
device.  Fear evolved.   
Fear cannot be characterized solely as a socially constructed phenomenon, nor as the 
instinctual response to personally felt traumas.  The growth and nature of fear must be studied 
as a process that develops under its own inertia, feeding off its antecedent past, and as a 
phenomenon that is shaped by and in turn shapes its institutional setting.  Fear should be 
understood as both structurally determined and socially transformative.  This research seeks 




“There is no terror in the bang, only in the anticipation of it” (Alfred Hitchcock). 
 
“People react to fear, not love.  They don’t teach that in Sunday school, but it’s true” 
(Richard Nixon). 
 
  Fear is a primal instinct; it is a survival mechanism the evolution of which allowed 
the early humans, indeed all species to adapt, evolve, and survive.  When humans moved into 
settled communities with more advanced means of production, the nature of fear – much like 
the nature of social relationships – changed.  Once the means of social reproduction were 
secured, fear became less necessary as a survival instinct and more useful as a heuristic 
device.  Fear evolved from solely the instinctually driven ‘flight or fight’ response to include 
a more nuanced and generalized state of anxiety that reproduces the social structure and 
teaches the individual the importance of adherence to social norms.   
Fear cannot be characterized solely as a socially constructed phenomenon, nor as the 
instinctual response to personally felt traumas.  The growth and nature of fear must be studied 
as a process that develops under its own inertia, feeding off its antecedent and instinctual 
past, as well as a phenomenon that is shaped by and in turn shapes its institutional setting.  
Fear should be understood as both structurally determined and socially transformative.    This 
research seeks to examine the ontology of fear, specifically as it relates to neoliberalism.  If 
fear is a universal experience for humans, an experience which cuts across class division and 
geo-political boundaries, then we must ask if the nature of fear is the same for all as well.    
1. The Nature of Fear 
Historically, waves of popular fear emerged as a product of the times in which they 
were situated, such as in the late nineteenth century panic of being buried alive or the mid-
twentieth century fear of nuclear destruction and fall-out fueled by the Cold War (Bourke 
2005).  The nature of fear evolves as society evolves.  When fears of self-sustenance had 
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been addressed, fears of social status and relative well-being emerged in its place (Bourke 
2003). 
Instead of examining fear and anxiety1 solely as something produced by our times, it 
is also important to understand how fear creates or perpetuates our institutions (Bourke 
2005).  If individual action and institutional evolution are truly interactive, then that should 
include the entire range of the human experience, including emotions.  Anxieties should not 
be thought of solely as a highly individual experience, but rather more accurately as the 
shared experience of individuals living within the same socio-cultural-historical context.  
Anxiety is embedded in the institutions that surround the individual and is routinized in her 
daily life (Jackson and Everts 2010).   
In order for the individual to exercise agency, she must be self-reflexive, and part of 
reflexive thought is the experience of fear. In the same way that agency is interactively 
constructed by the individual and her institutional context, so is fear.  Not only is there an 
instinctual element to fear - as demonstrated in the physiological response of the body - there 
is also a dimension to fear that is shaped by the interactivity between structure and agent 
(Bourke, 2003).  The greater the agency the individual feels the more anxious she potentially 
feels in return:  "The agency shifts.  Humans can control their own destiny, which in the 
hands of the responsible is wonderfully empowering.  In the hands of the paranoid, that 
power is terrifying" (Bourke 2005: 370).  It is important to recognize that there is a difference 
between individual and social anxieties, that is, there is a difference between the anxieties 
that an individual may singularly possess that are kept private, and the anxieties individuals 
                                                     
1 There are many arguments surrounding the delineation between fear and anxiety.  Instead of becoming 
entangled between what are certainly important differences, this research will focus on the causes of and 
responses to both fear and anxiety within the specific historical context of neoliberalism.  The categories 
themselves are less important than the interaction of both emotional states to the historically unique stage of 
capitalism - neoliberalism. 
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share across a particular community.  The latter shared social anxieties become part of the 
social structure and the social repository of knowledge (Jackson and Everts 2010) 
1.1 Fear and institutions 
The non-instinctual part of fear is both socially constructed and acts on the social 
structure - it is an interactive negotiation that gives fear its form and imbues it with meaning 
(Bourke 2003).  Fear and structure are thus interactive, both evolving independently and 
interactively (Bourke 2005).  The more community specific and the more superficial the 
social anxiety, the less likely the anxiety producing event is to provoke institutional change.  
The reverse is also true:  the more wide-spread and temporally resistant the social anxiety, the 
more likely institutional change – for instance, health protocols or waste infrastructure – will 
take place (Jackson and Everts 2010). 
Fear is given expression and articulation through social and cultural practice.  If the 
role of culture is to provide a coherent and consistent world view, then when that world view 
is threatened, all the security previously afforded by that cultural worldview is threatened, 
thus heightening anxieties (McBride 2011).When the object of an anxiety-inducing event is 
easy to locate, its elimination often results in the elimination of the anxiety (ex:  avian flu).  
When the object of the anxiety-inducing event cannot be easily located or eliminated (ex: 
terrorist threats), individuals must cope with constant anxiety.  When extended to the level of 
institutions, it is clear that persistent social anxieties are not relegated to the experience of the 
individual, but rather formal and informal institutions as well.  Importantly, redress from 
anxieties, whether or not their sources are easily located, falls to those institutions.  In 
contending with those social anxieties, institutions adapt and evolve as part of the coping 
process and it makes the interactivity between institutions and fear clear (Jackson and Everts 
2010).  For example, in response to terrorist threats from Islamic fundamentalists, the US 
government put stricter regulations in boarding planes into place.  Likewise, some churches 
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responded to the anxiety by burning copies of the Qur’an, while other churches initiated 
inter-faith dialogues to educate and alleviate anxieties with respect to Islam as a whole.   
As science and technology are agents of change, the progression of science and 
technology represent sources of anxieties.  Framed in this way, we can extend the Veblenian 
dichotomy beyond the institutional-ceremonial drag on progress and dig deeper into 
analyzing the anxieties provoked by institutional change.  In addition to the nature of the 
anxiety, the manner in which communities react to social anxieties determines the course of 
social action.  While some may catalyze technological change, pushing it forward even faster, 
other social anxieties may spark a reactionary response, with communities drawing on 
tradition and perhaps slowing the pace of social and technological change (Jackson and 
Everts 2010).   
1.2 Ontological insecurity and existential anxiety 
At the core of modern fear lie two essential and related causes:  ontological insecurity 
and existential anxiety.  Ontological insecurity is related to the individual’s need for social 
continuity and the ability to materially and socially reproduce her standard of living.  
Existential anxiety hinges on the individual’s ability to cope with the finiteness of living.  In 
everyday life, the individual finds significance through tasks and relations with others as well 
as through the potential to advance either socially or in the contribution toward some social 
goal.  When the individual discovers the authentic nature of being is one that ends in death, 
all potential and more generally, significance is lost.  When the individual experiences 
existential anxiety, it is as the result of the breakdown in social relationships that heretofore 
distracted or covered up for the individual the constant possibility of death, of nothingness 
(Stolorow 2007).  Anxiety also emerges as a result of the incompleteness of truth; that 
universal truths have always escaped humans contributes to human anxiety.  It is not 
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therefore necessarily the finiteness of man's life that is as troubling as the limitations to his 
knowledge, including knowledge of what happens after death (Barrett 1958). 
The less ontologically secure must work much harder to push existential anxiety into 
latency.  Death might be the great equalizer, but when we face it and under what 
circumstances, is most decidedly not.  This is especially true on a very basic level in areas 
where health care is not considered a human right, or where health care is not adequately 
funded and accessible to all.  Accessibility to healthcare is part of our everyday ontological 
security, so while all of us must eventually face death, some of us are more ontologically 
secured than others.  To this end, ontological security helps to forestall the pervasiveness in 
the foreground of thought of existential anxiety and as such, those who are more 
ontologically secure, that is, more successful within the neoliberal project, are better 
equipped to push into the background or to cover up the constant threat of nothingness or 
death and therefore are able to ameliorate existential anxiety. 
According to Heidegger (as well as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), it is the individual's 
inability to come to grips with her existential anxiety (angst) that contributes to the 
acceptance of and adherence to social norms (Jackson and Everts 2010).  The anxiety of 
death, of the nothingness-of-being is forestalled, ameliorated, or covered up by the 
participation of the individual with a social group:  "…'they' provides a constant 
tranquillization about death" (Heidegger in Stolorow 2007: 377).  Death is no longer a 
constant threat, but is transformed into some ambiguous future event.  Involvement with a 
social group is therefore a coping mechanism against the ever-present threat of death 
(Stolorow 2007).  The greater the existential anxiety, the deeper the allegiance to identity 
groups and ideologically driven beliefs runs (McBride 2011). 
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2. The Devil You Know 
2.1 Nativist reaction 
Individuals are largely, albeit tacitly driven by their personal psychological needs in 
the process of decision making. In the face of either ontological insecurity or existential 
anxiety, individuals are more likely to cling to the status quo, that is, to espouse conservative 
values in the face of change, even when it is counter to what outsiders view as the 
individual's long term best interest (Jost 2006).  During periods of heightened uncertainty and 
anxiety, individuals gravitate toward philosophically conservative, right-wing2 ideals which 
provide concrete answers to unanswerable questions and which also provide boundaries for 
order, structure, and hierarchy that relieve the individual from having to process too much 
information and make too many decisions in an uncertain environment (Jost and Hunyady 
2005).  Ideologies and belief systems are the outcome of individuals wrestling with 
existential concerns; the sharper the existential concerns, as occurs in times of acute crisis, 
the more individuals seek existential reassurance from their constructed belief systems.  As 
such, conservative ideologies anchored in tradition and the past, become more attractive in 
times of heightened existential crisis.  It is when uncertainty pervades and further crisis looms 
that traditional/conservative ideologies find stronger adherents as well as new recruits 
(Salzman 2008). 
The anxieties of the individual may remain latent, especially in times of relative 
security and prosperity, but the anxieties are nevertheless there, lurking beneath the surface.  
So too then is the possibility of a renewed commitment and allegiance to institutions that 
offer conservative ideals ever present, ready to rise in the face of uncertainty.  Historically, 
events that are traumatic at the national level tend to heighten the appeal of not just 
                                                     
2 Extensive psychological research by Jost found that "system threat" and "fear of death" were the two strongest 
evokers of conservativism (2006, 662-3). 
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conservative leaders, but also of conservative values writ large.  Hitler's rise from the 
cauldron of the Great Depression was less the outcome of charismatic trickery, and more the 
result of the sharp ontological and existential crises faced by the people in the throes of the 
worst crisis of capitalism to date (Jost 2006).  As Hayek pointed out, in times of heightened 
uncertainty or threat, individuals become more willing to accept leadership that proposes 
strict rules and deep social sanctions for violation of those rules (1944). 
As individuals become disembedded from their old social structures, insecurity 
compels them to create social moorings and continuity through a re-imagination of  those 
social structures to which they plead greater allegiance and fidelity than they otherwise would 
have done absent the systemic changes. As the individual becomes de-contextualized via 
change both political and economic, she can become more attached to an imagined past, and 
in so doing, become more deeply rooted in that imagined tradition and less tolerant of 
deviations from it (Kinnvall 2004).  The dismantling of tradition and the uprooting of social 
ties provokes nativist reactions manifest in religious fundamentalism as well as in a 
resurgence of right-wing, neo-fascist organizations, which in turn produce well-defined 
"others."  These reactions promise social continuity and security by giving meaning, purpose, 
and self-esteem to the individual (Salzman 2008). 
2.2 System justification theory 
  Within the field of social psychology, the theory of system justification attempts to 
uncover why individuals defend the status quo of a system, even when the status quo does not 
act in the individual’s best interest.  One of the most powerful explanations uncovered 
through empirical research on the matter is that of “situational antecedents” (Jost and 
Hunyady 2005: 260).  An individual's personal set of ideologies endows her/him with a set of 
mental models which enables the individual to legitimize the institutional context in which 
s/he sits (Jost et al. 2003).  Further legitimization appears inevitable when the interactivity 
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between individuals and institutions is taken into consideration and that ideologies and 
institutions are not formed in a vacuum but rather are partially co-constructive (not to 
discount internal evolution).   
System justification theory is not context dependent, but rather relies on the 
psychological processes individuals employ to cope with uncertainty and anxiety.  For 
instance, researchers found that individuals from Western capitalist countries and individuals 
from Eastern Bloc, formerly command planned economies both engaged in system 
justification despite the different systems they were respectively defending.  It seems to be a 
human compulsion to defend the present system when faced with uncertainty and anxiety 
regardless of what that current system might be.  It is truly a case of ‘the devil you know’ 
(Jost and Hunyady 2005). 
 That the individual seeks reassurance of order in the face of loss of personal control is 
what lends itself to system justification.  System justification entails much more than 
distinguishing the in-group from the “other;” system justification means that individuals 
support and advocate for the continuance of a system regardless of its empirical efficacy and 
oppose any social change.  This dogmatic support of a system is more the result of a feeling 
of a loss of personal control rather than a response to existential anxiety which is more likely 
to provoke allegiance to a world view by way of invidious distinction from the other/s 
(Rutjens and Loseman 2010).  
As part of the system justification process, individuals begin to legitimize their 
surrounding institutional context by rationalizing the status quo.  The ideologies that 
individuals use in order to rationalize the system include:  "...the Protestant work ethic, 
meritocratic ideology, fair market ideology, economic system justification, belief in a just 
world…” to name but a few (Jost and Hunyady 2005: 260-1).3  Experiments also show that 
                                                     
3 See Jost and Hunyady 2005 for a table that includes the ideology and descriptive content, p. 261. 
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individuals are more willing to engage in the stereotyping of others in the justification of a 
system that sustains inequality as a means of justifying the hierarchy (Jost and Hunyady 
2005). 
Many individuals who engage in system justification when it clearly is not in their 
own best interest to do so, such as with disadvantaged groups, suffer from depression which 
has been correlated to that rejection of alternative (different from their own) systems. 
Additionally, and regardless of the circumstances, these same disadvantaged groups 
continually perceived the more advantaged in a favorable light - even when a sub-section of 
the advantaged might be blamed for the current anxiety and uncertainty of the disadvantaged, 
such as with the case of questionable business practices in the corporate and banking sector 
(Jost and Hunyady 2005). 
Since individuals who justify the market system are unrealistically optimistic about 
their own future and believe they have control over market outcomes, when failure does 
strike, the blow stirs more anxiety than might otherwise emerge.  The heightened levels of 
anxiety that result from the unexpected losses lead individuals not to blame the system, but to 
place blame elsewhere, such as on other individuals who likewise have failed (Jost et al. 
2003).  That with which we find fault in others spotlights what we do not like about 
ourselves.  Since that fear or hatred of others is at least partially rooted in self-loathing, it 
becomes all the more attractive to be able to identify an ‘other’ on whom we may unload 
those undesired characteristics and focus our outrage (Bourke 2005). 





3.1 Moral panics 
Any given society during any given historical time faces a number of possible 
dangers; which dangers are selected from the lottery for close scrutiny and alarm is a function 
of the moral position of the society - what that society finds morally reprehensible or morally 
laudable.  A danger that allows for a specific group or social institution to be targeted as its 
source imbues the danger with form and articulation (Glassner 2009).  Moral panics 
demonstrate in rather dramatic fashion, society's limits to the tolerance of non-conformist 
behavior (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). 
Within the literature on moral panics, much attention has been paid to the socio-
economic conditions within which the panic catalyzed.  Studies found that in all historical 
cases researched, some systemic unrest existed that was difficult to articulate.  This is not to 
suggest a conspiratorial element, that moral panics are created whole-cloth in order to distract 
the public and keep them occupied with some specific demon not central to the functioning of 
the status quo.  Rather, it is to suggest that during periods of generalized, difficult to 
articulate and tacit discomfort the public will seize the opportunity to name an evil and 
challenge it (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994).   
Moral panics are also more likely to emerge during periods of concentrated 
technological and social change, when the norms of a society soften and material progress 
inspires changes to tradition or custom.  The less rigid and clear the social mores and norms, 
the more fertile society is for the emergence of a moral panic (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994).  
The ability to blame another group enables the individual to transfer an unnamed and tacit 
anxiety into a known and objectified fear.  The individual is able to not only find an external 
locus of blame, but is at the same time, asserting the ‘sacredness’ of themselves and their 
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choices (Kinnvall 2004).  Scapegoating thus assists the individual in constructing an external 
locus of blame - that of the demonized other (Bourke 2005). 
Moral panics thus serve a dual purpose:  one, it makes the threat easily identifiable 
and labeled; and two, greater panic means greater acceptance by the public of whatever 
measures might be used to annihilate that threat.  Attention is redirected from the cause of the 
threat to support for whatever action might quell it (Bourke 2005). A moral panic is 
punctuated fear which demands an immediate remedy (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). 
Moral panics, although relatively recently named, have a storied history.  The 
contextualization of social phenomenon demonstrates that specific social conditions engender 
specific social responses, so it is true of neoliberalism, that specific moral panics repeatedly 
emerge, none so obvious in its classism as that of the panic of the wanton welfare queen 
(Cohen 2002). Fear not only distracts individuals from issues associated with income 
inequality but when it pays attention to class, it does so by painting the poor as part of the 
problem.  The effect is two-fold:  the poor are demonized, and those who might be positioned 
in the lower income brackets assure themselves that their relative income position is higher 
than those other poor demons (Glassner 2009).  If the exception can be promoted to 
perception of rule, then the moral panic has seized.  The outrage over the amoral and corrupt 
attempts of unwed mothers to cheat the system promoted the case for individual 
responsibility in general while rallying support for the shrinking of the welfare state 
specifically (Cohen 2002). 
3.2 Religion and terror 
While moral panics burn brightly but briefly, the slow flame of fundamentalist 
religious beliefs smolders and burns continuously.  With each there is an evil that is easy to 
name and blame, but with fundamentalism comes the entrenchment of tradition and religious 
clarity that enemies remain enemies with no redemption but through conversion.  The 
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consistency of belief provides relief against personal crises of ontological insecurity and 
existential anxiety.   
The subject matter of terror management theory (TMT) is existential anxiety and the 
manner in which individuals cope with it (Friedman and Rholes 2008).  Researchers in the 
area of TMT have found an empirical positive correlation between existential anxiety and 
culture:  ". . . people defend their ideologies when reminded of their mortality (McBride 
2011).  An individual’s “morality salience” heightens the individual’s reliance on mental 
constructs that offer salves to the fear of death; existential anxiety and supernatural beliefs are 
thus positively correlated in individuals with pre-existing religious belief constructs.  As a 
corollary, when those religious belief structures are threatened or undermined, the 
individual’s existential anxiety increases accordingly (Friedman and Rholes 2008).     
 Even the most heavily ideologically-laden acts of terrorism are motivated at their core 
by existential anxiety.  That individuals are conscious of their own mortality and even more 
importantly, their inability to predict, control, or prevent the finality of death stirs deep 
anxiety that pushes individuals to find solace or meaning with other like-minded individuals 
with whom they share the same eventual fate.  In other words, the continuity of culture is 
partly a by-product of the individual's need for meaning in the face of otherwise emotionally 
crippling existential anxiety.  All individuals must grapple with existential anxiety - it is a 
struggle that transcends culture and history.  The response to that struggle, however, is 
culturally driven and defined (McBride 2011). 
Individuals employ many mechanisms in efforts to cope with existential anxiety:  
religious devotion, family and friends, social groups, and social causes.  The most efficient 
cultural construct in the amelioration of existential anxiety is that of religion, which assuages 
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fear of death by offering specific answers to what happens after death4.  The stricter a religion 
and the more detailed its portrayal of life after death, the more that religious conviction 
appears to assuage existential anxiety (Friedman and Rholes 2008).  Once adopted, 
allegiances become very difficult to disentangle from an individual's identity if that identity is 
ideologically based.  Ideological thinking that maintains internal logical consistency (ex:  
through God's ubiquitous and universal laws) and promises future realization (life after death) 
becomes very difficult to dismantle with logical reasoning (McBride 2011). Those 
individuals who seek meaning and social continuity by joining terrorist groups find that the 
acts of violence ultimately only amplify the loss of meaning and disruption of social 
continuity, instead of ameliorating it.  As a result, individuals become even more attached to 
the ideology and more entrenched in the terrorist activities (McBride 2011). 
Depravation motivates aggression, and those who have been either materially, 
emotionally, or creativity-deprived, strike aggressively.  The isolated individual who is 
denied the right to experience control over her access to the material and the emotionally 
satisfying, lashes out in acts of physical aggression, that taken to the extreme results in 
terrible acts of violence and destruction.  The self-actualization routinely denied by 
neoliberalism either through the ontological insecurity of denial to access of the means of 
physical reproduction or through the existential breakdown of the financial failure-to-be, 
manifests into physical attacks on the tangible representatives of Western neoliberalism, such 
as the World Trade Towers.  Taken to the absolute limit, we find Dr. Strangelove’s emotional 
release only through the literal destruction of the Earth (Becker 1971).   
                                                     
4 Secular worldviews include a variety of possibilities including identification with a particular nation, sports 




4. Fear and Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism, as understood from the perspective of Western market economies, 
embodies the ideological shift in the purpose of the state from one that has a responsibility to 
insure full employment and protect its citizens against the exigencies of the market to one 
that has a responsibility to insure protection of the market itself (Harvey, 2005).  The 
neoliberal narrative consists of a central ideological construct – that of hyper-individualism – 
upon which the justification of neoliberalism rests, the consequences of which legitimize and 
prioritize market activities above socially integrative activities.  “Neoliberalism thoroughly 
revises what it means to be a human person;” (Mirowski 2013: 58) neoliberalism teaches 
through the socialization process that each individual should be accountable to herself and in 
so doing, each individual’s responsibility to others and to the collective is eroded.  Society is 
then comprised entirely and solely of self-interested, atomistic individuals seeking to forward 
their own agendas.  The emphasis on individual accountability and responsibility naturally 
segues into the power of the individual acting alone.     
The hyper-individualism of neoliberalism encourages an increasingly fragmented 
notion of the self, one that is disconnected from any community, consisting less of a coherent 
whole and more of an amalgamation of superficial, commodified identities.  This ad hoc, 
material construction of the self, mirrors the relentless accumulation imperative of capitalism 
in that it can never be satiated, and the self is therefore perpetually incomplete and ill-
defined.  As Mirowski suggests, “(neoliberalism) replaces the time-honored ambition to 
‘know yourself’ with the exhortation to ‘express yourself’ . . .” (2013: 92).  The focus on 
exoteric measures of worth rather than internal self-actualization stirs within the individual 
invidious comparisons against other individuals and dogged fears of inadequacy.  
As material progress has amplified, so too has the complexity of capitalism, especially 
with respect to its modern incarnation of neoliberalism.  With greater complexity comes less 
16 
 
transparency and individuals slip further out of touch with the totality.  This disrupted 
orientation has grown as capitalism has evolved.  As well, mystification deepens as 
capitalism evolves:  what was not known in the material production of objects in the early 
stages of capitalism has grown into a complete disconnection with the way in which ever 
more abstract markets for intangible assets operate in neoliberalism.  One cannot help but feel 
deeply anxious about residing in a totality s/he doesn't understand or cannot even envision on 
a practical level (Tally 2010).  
4.1 Alienation 
Alienation, while not new to the human condition, becomes heightened in the 
industrial and post-industrial world (McBride 2011).  More specifically, neoliberalism 
heightens the feeling of isolation and individualism such that it sharpens existential anxiety.   
A vicious cycle presents itself:  those who are more alienated within the system of 
neoliberalism likewise experience diminished ontological security; those individuals who are 
less ontologically secure are less equipped to cope with existential anxiety, and less able to 
push that anxiety into latency.  Therefore, those individuals, twice alienated – once through 
the neoliberal project, and again through the experience of existential anxiety – must find 
more dramatic and all-encompassing means of connection with others in order to push 
against that alienation.  This perhaps explains why some individuals forge deep allegiance 
with extra-economic, (perhaps extra-) social groups, as they must compensate for the 
amplification of alienation.    
 As social relationships disintegrate under the pressure of market intensification and 
the individual is forced to act more on her own behalf, relying less of social institutions and 
familial networks, anxiety reawakens.  With the global spread of neoliberalism, traditional 
and cultural values become undermined or eroded by market values.  The result is an increase 
in existential anxiety, which serves to escalate allegiances to outside identity groups 
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(McBride 2011).  If, as Becker proposes, financial success is the "new universal immortality 
ideology," (in Salzman 2008: 320) then it stands to reason that individuals who are less 
financially successful will seek amelioration of their existential anxieties through other 
cultural constructs that promise some sort of immortality whether it is through religion or 
historical memory.  The attraction of religion, as previously explained, is that it offers 
universal certainties; individuals who follow the rules are guaranteed success within that 
religion, whether it is immediate acceptance into the fold or the delayed promise of eternal 
salvation. Religion also offers restricted choice sets, which individuals experiencing 
heightened uncertainty appreciate, as a limited (or no) choice set removes the possibility of 
making a wrong choice (Kinnvall 2004). Clear cut rules on a checklist for success (salvation 
of any sundry variety) provides much greater certainty than the neoliberal project which 
holds the promise of the ‘american dream’ and the myth of self-madeness, but without a 
definitive how-to and without a guarantee of success.  
Despite the tendency within capitalism of increasing market segmentation, 
neoliberalism tends to refocus individuals onto material concerns and reshapes priorities to 
align with the primacy of the functioning of the disembedded economy while exalting the 
status of the individual.  As the reorganization of society to support the neoliberal stage of 
capitalism threatens the continuity of tradition structures within communities, so too is the 
self-esteem that individuals construct from belonging to those tradition structures (Salzman 
2008).   
4.2 Power relations 
As individuals attempt to reconcile their own perceptions with the surrounding social 
structure, emotions such as fear play a critical part in informing the individual of her place 
and role.  As such, fear is a reflection of the power relationships within a society.  The 
network of power relations within the neoliberal social structure of accumulation, which 
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dominates the other spheres of living, therefore plays a powerful role in how any given 
individual experiences fear; those less powerfully positioned experience more intense degrees 
of fear.  This is not to say that fear can be mapped directly on to class; the experience of 
emotions cannot be used as a sorting mechanism for class (Bourke 2005).  Rather, fear is 
enactive knowledge in that it informs the interaction between the individual agent and her 
surrounding social structure; it is enactive knowledge that tacitly communicates power 
relations (Bourke 2003).   
Indeed, power relations often define the fear that an individual experiences.  For 
instance, during the 1940s, children from upper and middle class families could be medically 
diagnosed as having a fear of school and as such received treatment and educational 
accommodation for their condition.  Working class or poor children who did not attend 
school regardless of reason were considered truant, and they and their parents lawfully 
prosecuted.  The emotional experience attached to school was thus defined institutionally and 
varied according to economic status (Bourke 2005).  The reaction to social anxieties is 
context specific and dependent upon other background anxieties already at work, as well as 
the power structures in place.  For example, with the threat of the "swine flu" pandemic, 
Egypt responded by wiping out the swine stock owned by a religious minority in the area, 
Asian countries placed an embargo on pork products from North America, and in the US, the 
lobbying arm of the pork industry campaigned vociferously through the media and through 
Congress to message to the public that pork was still safe.  Here we see three different 
reactions to the same social anxiety, each of which is the result of the present anxiety context 
and local institutionalized power structure (Jackson and Everts 2010). 
In the US, with help from the media, the public is taught how and what to fear:  road 
rage, adolescent mothers, drugs, internet predators.  The stories are hyperbolized and the 
causes not explored.  Following any media scare, an in-depth journalistic analysis is offered 
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to explore the root causes of the tragic event.  The root causes often focus on the individual/s 
responsible for the event, rather than looking at larger systemic or structural issues that might 
have provoked it.  For instance, following reports of the phenomenon of "road rage" were in-
depth looks at possible neurological conditions that might have spawned the rage, but no real 
analysis on the impact of urban sprawl, increased commute times, or the escalation of the 
housing prices, forcing individuals to move farther from city centers (Glassner 2009).  
Focusing on the individual rather than structural causes of any incident reinforces the 
neoliberal narrative of individual responsibility.   
4.3 Neoliberal policies 
 While economists might (over)state that the market system is efficient, there is not 
general, professional agreement about the inherent fairness of the market. The average 
individual, however, interprets efficiency as fairness and thus is convinced of the ultimate 
fairness of the market economy – individuals mistake choice in the market place for control 
over market place outcomes.  Moreover, since the market's efficiency is interpreted by the 
average individual as fairness, and one of the maxims of the market is that of the individual 
pursuing her/his own interest, the 'virtue' of selfishness is itself justified.  The longevity of the 
market system - bolstered throughout its life by government intervention - creates an 
institutional path dependence that further legitimizes its continued existence (Jost et al. 2003). 
The equating of market efficiency and market fairness is stretched further by the ethos of 
neoliberalism which claims that freer markets operate even more efficiently and emphasizes 
the trope of hyper-individualism. 
The idea that individuals control their own respective fates in the neoliberal market 
place coupled with their unrealistic optimism regarding their own future prosperity assists 
individuals in coping with the uncertainty and anxiety created by the market system in the 
first place.  As well, individuals tend not to support policies which would redistribute wealth 
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because of overly optimistic beliefs of their own individual prosperity - a mental model that 
prevails especially among the less educated (Jost et al. 2003).  The perpetual state of crisis 
avoidance within the neoliberal project breeds insecurity and uncertainty. Moreover, while 
individuals operate under the perception of complete autonomy and efficacy, the veiled locus 
of power resides in the deep political reach of the corporate sector.   
The impact of institutions on fear is evident by examining the evolution of fear:  the 
fear that inspired manic bank runs in the early part of the twentieth century has been 
systematically addressed by the government invention of the FDIC (Bourke 2005).  Fear also 
drives crucial allocation decisions in public spending.  With the rise of neoliberalism, more 
funds are channeled into research and programs that assist statistically fewer individuals 
(Glassner 2009). Neoconservatives (inaptly named) fan the flame of distrust and when 
possible moral panics about perceived threats from welfare recipients or terrorists in order to 
obfuscate the failures of the neoliberal state while simultaneously bolstering the neoliberal 
policies of retrenchment of the welfare state and the strengthening of national defense 
(Lipsitz 1998). 
Globalization represents the spread of the neoliberal ideology which began in the late 
1970s in the Western world, and spread via transnational corporate encroachment and aid 
packages delivered to developing countries tied with contingencies that attempted to establish 
stability, but instead created instability through the introduction of massive institutional 
changes requisite to support the neoliberal ideology and agenda (Kinnvall 2004).  The impact 
of neoliberalism is felt on two fronts:  one, in that the continuity of social relationships 
erodes; two that the indigenous traditions and customs are steamrolled by the values of the 
marketplace, and previous ethnographic markers of success are replaced by pecuniary 
measures (Salzman 2008).  Capitalism, in all its forms, but especially in neoliberalism, 
requires democracy to sustain it.  So with the spread of markets came the spread of 
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democracy, undermining former social institutions and traditions, and fueling insecurity and 
amplifying the isolation already wrought by capitalist structures.   Globalization threatens 
continuity of life on the local level; it invites ontological insecurity as individuals can no 
longer be certain of work and their places in society to which they've become accustomed.  
Democracy - thought in the Western world to be the great liberator - threatens tradition and 
social custom at a local level.  In seeking continuity and security, individuals will reach 
toward collective identity groups which offer simple rhetoric framed in familiar terms.  As 
the welfare state shrank in both the Western world and in developing countries, identity 
groups grew to fill the void and to offer continuity and security (Kinnvall 2004). 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Individuals cling to the idea that they live in an ordered world that will reward the just 
and punish the deserving because to live in a world where chaos reigns and the individual 
bears no control over her fate creates a level of anxiety that is too difficult for the individual 
to negotiate on her own.  This is part of the reason that individuals tend to see the world as 
just and karmic even when their own individual experiences might indicate otherwise.  The 
corollary to the belief that the world is a fair and just place is the idea that those who are in 
some way disadvantaged or have failed within the market system deserved to do so – it is the 
fault of the poor that they are poor, and further, it is the fault of the poor that they remain that 
way.  The rich, likewise, deserve what they have, regardless of how their wealth might have 
been acquired (Jost et al. 2003).   Accordingly, neoliberalism with its hyper-individualism 
becomes painted as meritocratic.   
As research in social psychology demonstrates, even if the public were convinced that 
neoliberalism is not what its rhetoric avails, individuals would still be reticent to change their 
habits of thought, and would likely become even more emotionally attached to the empty 
consumerist culture and individual rigor that characterizes neoliberalism.  Moreover, within 
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neoliberalism, fear is profitable for politicians, the media, the medical community, and even 
religion; the very institutions to which individuals turn for information and protection from 
fear are the very ones who profit from our continual fear (Bourke 2005).  Fear, which 
prompts this nativist reaction and neoliberalism which promotes ontological insecurity and 
reinforces fear, thus sustain each other.  
The point is not to eradicate fear, or to even attempt to do so.  Indeed we often pay to 
be afraid, whether it is a horror movie or a rollercoaster.  Fear inspires and humanizes us; it 
ignites the imagination for better or worse and can be exhilarating (Bourke 2005).  The point 
is that we should not be afraid to engage honestly and introspectively with our fear so that we 
don’t simply retreat to the comfort of known horrors or sublimate our fears onto others who 
have no way of assuaging the authentic source of our fear.  If we address the systemic issues 
that create those situations which fuel fear instead of narrowing our scope of examination to 
the experience of the individual, then as a society we have the potential to treat the causes 
instead of the symptoms of fear.  While there appear to be few limits on the imagining of the 
potential of technology and material progress, humans are much more limited in the 
imagining of social futures; the current status quo limits the imagining of the potential (Tally 
2010). If the inability of the individual to imagine the totality results in alienation and 
anxiety, then in imagining a future without anxiety, the individual would become dis-
alienated from society.  It is the role of the social economist to help the individual in that 
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